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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Appellant, Lillian Hatheway (Ms. Hatheway), appeals the district court's dismissal, on 
summary judgment, of all of her claims against Respondents, Board of Regents of the University 
of Idaho and University of Idaho (U of I). Ms. Hatheway worked at U of I from 1999 to 2008 as 
an administrative assistant. She resigned from U of I on August 28, 2008. Ms. Hatheway then 
sued U of I for age discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation, constructive discharge 
and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Ms. Hatheway appeals the Judgment dismissing 
her claims entered on December 15, 2011 (R. Vol. III, pp. 689 - 690), pursuant to the district 
court's Opinion and Order on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment dated November 10, 
2011. (R. Vol. III, pp. 669 - 688.) 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On October 22, 2008, Ms. Hatheway filed suit against the Board of Regents of the 
University of Idaho and the University of Idaho, alleging four causes of action: (1) Age 
discrimination and hostile work environment under the IHRA; (2) unlawful retaliation under the 
IHRA; (3) constructive discharge; and (4) negligent infliction of emotional distress. 
On August 18, 2011, U of I filed a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of all 
of Ms. Hatheway'S claims. In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the district court 
considered all materials submitted by the parties including supporting briefs and oral argument. 
The district court also considered the applicable standard for summary judgment, both generally 
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and in employment discrimination cases. The district court held as follows concerning Ms. 
Hatheway's claims: 
Age Discrimination Claim 
[T]he Court must consider the third element of an age discrimination claim, 
which requires a showing by Plaintiff that she was discharged or was 
subjected to adverse decisions by her employer and, but for her age, the 
discharge or adverse decisions would not have occurred. Defendants 
contend this element has not been met and is dispositive of her claim. The 
Court agrees. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 679) 
Plaintiff Hatheway has failed to demonstrate she was constructively 
discharged or received disparate treatment. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 681) 
[T]he Court is unable to find that a reasonable trier of fact could find she 
was driven from the workplace or that her age played any role in her 
performance evaluations. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 682) 
Ms. Hatheway has simply failed to demonstrate that age was a factor 
driving Dr. Olsson's actions as required in order to establish a prima facie 
claim for age discrimination. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 683) 
Hostile Work Environment Claim 
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Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate that she was subjected to age 
discrimination and, therefore, has failed to demonstrate that her workplace 
was permeated with discriminatory intimidation that was sufficiently severe 
or pervasive as to alter the conditions of her employment. 
The Court, after considering the record as a whole, is unable to find either 
subjectively or objectively that a hostile work environment was created as a 
result of age discrimination. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 684) 
Unlawful Retaliation Claim 
[T]here is no evidence that the University retaliated against her because she 
engaged in protected activities. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 685) 
Constructive Discharge Claim 
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate she was the subject of age 
discrimination. The absence of such a showing is fatal to her claim for 
constructive discharged (sic) based on age discrimination. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 686) 
Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim 
Ms. Hatheway has failed to demonstrate the Defendants breached a duty 
owed to her. There being no breach of duty shown, Ms. Hatheway's claim 
for negligent infliction of emotional distress thereby fails. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 686) 
C. Statement of Facts 
1. Background and English Department Staff. 
a. On or about November 29, 1999, Ms. Hatheway was hired by U of! as an 
Administrative Assistant II (AAII) for the Dean's Office. Ms. Hatheway continued to work in 
that capacity through September 9,2002, when she laterally transferred to the English Department, 
where she continued to work as an AAII under the supervision and administration of David 
Barber, the Chair of the Department at that time. (R. Vol. I, pp. 109 - 110, Depo of Lillian 
Hatheway, p. 14, 11. 4 - 11 and p. 35, 1. 23 - p. 37,1. 8.)1 
I Specific pages and lines to deposition transcripts are provided for ease of reference in addition to the required format 
for citation to the record. 
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b. In approximately July of 2005, Dr. Kurt Olsson (Dr. Olsson) took over the 
position of Chair for the Department and he became Ms. Hatheway's direct supervisor. (R. Vol. I, 
pp. 151 - 152, ~ 7.) During that time, support personnel for the Department consisted of an AAII 
position, which was filled by Ms. Hatheway, and a Financial Technician (FT) position. (Id.) 
c. Not long after Dr. Olsson took over the position of Chair, the FT position 
for the Department became vacant and a four person search committee, which included both Dr. 
Olsson and Ms. Hatheway, was formed to hire a replacement. (R. Vol. I, p. 152, ~ 8.) The four 
person search committee, including Ms. Hatheway, supported the decision to hire Deborah Allen 
(Ms. Allen) into the FT position. (R. Vol. I, p. 111, Depo of Lillian Hatheway, p. 44, 1. 15 - p. 45, 
1. 4; and R. Vol. I, p. 152, ~ 9.) 
d. After the search committee unanimously decided to offer Ms. Allen the FT 
position, Dr. Olsson began negotiations to make Ms. Allen a competitive salary offer based upon 
Ms. Allen's knowledge and experience, market forces, and the Department's needs. Ms. Allen 
accepted the offer on September 9,2005, beginning her first day in the Department on September 
13,2005. (R. Vol. I, p. 152, ~ 9; R. Vol. I, p. 98, ~ 3.) Dr. Olsson's decision to offer Ms. Allen a 
competitive salary was taken for legitimate non-discriminatory reasons and without regard for the 
ages of either Ms. Hatheway or Ms. Allen. Instead, Dr. Olsson's decision was based upon the 
Department's need for a knowledgeable and experienced applicant who was willing to take the 
position at a salary commensurate with what Ms. Allen had been making in her prior 
non-supervisory position in the U of I. (R. Vol. I, pp. 152 - 153, ~ 10; R. Vol. I, p. 98, Jd.) 
e. Almost immediately upon the hiring of Ms. Allen, Ms. Hatheway came to 
Dr. Olsson and made it clear that she was angry that he had offered a larger salary to Ms. Allen 
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than what had been posted in the job announcement, and that Ms. Allen was making a higher wage 
than Ms. Hatheway. Dr. Olsson spoke with Ms. Hatheway in an attempt to explain his reasoning 
for making such a decision. During their discussion, Ms. Hatheway stated she viewed this as 
being "ethically" unfair and she felt she had a right to be paid at the same rate as Ms. Allen. (R. 
Vol. I, p. 153, ~~ 12 and 13; R. Vol. I, pp. 111 112, Depo of Lillian Hatheway, p. 42,1. 25 - p. 43, 
1. 20 and p. 47, 1. 2 - p. 48, 1. 9.) Despite Dr. Olsson's attempt to explain to Ms. Hatheway that Ms. 
Allen had worked in the Office of Sponsored Programs in a supervisory capacity and that Ms. 
Allen would be taking a pay cut by accepting the FT position, Ms. Hatheway refused to accept the 
fact that such negotiations are a standard practice in a professional field. CR. Vol. I, p. 153, ~ 12.) 
Ms. Hatheway told Dr. Olsson that she felt that because it was Ms. Allen's decision to move into a 
lower paying position, that Ms. Allen should have taken the amount that was offered in the job 
announcement. CR. Vol. I, pp. 111 112, Depo of Lillian Hatheway, p. 45, 1. 5 - p. 46, 1. 13.) 
Ms. Hatheway further testified that, if she had been reimbursed at an equal rate of pay as Ms. 
Allen, she would have been satisfied and would have felt that the issue had been resolved. CR. 
Vol. I, p. 111, Depo of Lillian Hatheway, p. 42, 1. 25 - p. 43, 1. 20.) Ms. Hatheway also admitted 
that the problem started for her when Ms. Allen was hired and was paid a wage higher than the 
wage that Ms. Hatheway was making. CR. Vol. I, p. 112, Depo of Lillian Hatheway, p. 48, 11. 
10-18.) 
f. Not long after his discussion with Ms. Hatheway regarding Ms. Allen's 
salary, Dr. Olsson returned from a business trip to discover that while he was away, Ms. Hatheway 
had been making disparaging remarks to other employees about himself and Ms. Allen. CR. Vol. 
I, p. 153, ~ 13.) Dr. Olsson told Ms. Hatheway very clearly that if she had issues with himself or 
-6 
Ms. Allen, Ms. Hatheway should speak directly to him, as complaining to other members of the 
Department served no useful purpose, was counterproductive behavior, and damaged the 
Department. Dr. Olsson also told Ms. Hatheway that such behavior was unacceptable and would 
not be tolerated. (ld.) 
g. In the months following the above-described meeting between Dr. Olsson 
and Ms. Hatheway, Dr. Olsson heard nothing further from Ms. Hatheway, nor any other member 
of the Department, so he assumed they had moved beyond their differences and that Ms. Hatheway 
would come directly to him with any issues that concerned her. Acting under this assumption and 
in spite of Ms. Hatheway's lapse in professional conduct as described above, Dr. Olsson prepared a 
very positive 2005 annual Performance Evaluation for Ms. Hatheway, based in part upon Ms. 
Hatheway's job performance during that time in which she was under his direct supervision, and 
based in part upon the prior Chair's observations of Ms. Hatheway's work performance under his 
supervision during the first half of2005. (R. Vol. I, p. 154, ~ 14.) 
h. As the Department moved into 2006, Dr. Olsson was dismayed to learn that 
Ms. Hatheway's counterproductive behavior was not only recurring, but that said behavior was 
forming an increasingly serious pattern as Ms. Hatheway continued to voice her complaints and 
dislike of Ms. Allen and Dr. Olsson to others within the Department. (R. Vol. I, p. 154, ~ 15.) 
Ms. Allen, a very task-oriented professional, is not given to small talk when there was work to be 
done, and Dr. Olsson believes Ms. Hatheway perceived Ms. Allen's reticence to indulge in idle 
chit-chat as unfriendliness. Despite Dr. Olsson's efforts to effect change in a positive manner, 
rather than confrontationally, things got worse and there appeared to be occasions when Ms. 
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Hatheway would suddenly react negatively and upsettingly, and she seemed to be out of control. 
(/d.) 
1. Ms. Allen reported her unpleasant encounters with Ms. Hatheway to Dr. 
Olsson, and she brought her concerns to the U of I's Human Resources (HR) Department. (R. 
Vol. I, p. 1 00, ~ 6.) Toward the end of 2006, Dr. Olsson felt that any intervention on his part 
between Ms. Allen and Ms. Hatheway would further jeopardize the Department and make 
relationships even more tense, so he went to April Preston (Ms. Preston) in U of I's Human 
Resources Department (HR) to seek her guidance and counsel. Ms. Preston reinforced the 
importance of procedure in arriving at a solution, and helped Dr. Olsson to understand his options. 
Dr. Olsson felt the need to issue to Ms. Hatheway a clear statement that Ms. Hatheway'S overall 
performance, specifically in the area of professional conduct, needed to improve, and that Ms. 
Hatheway'S counterproductive behavior needed to end. (R. Vol. I, p. 155, ~ 17.) 
J. Before Dr. Olsson had the opportunity to prepare Ms. Hatheway'S 2006 
Performance Evaluation, by January of2007, Ms. Allen had reached the point where she felt it best 
that she resign. Although Ms. Allen liked the job and the faculty members, her interactions with 
Ms. Hatheway had become very difficult to tolerate. (R. Vol. I, p. 155, ~ 18; and R. Vol. I, p. 100, 
~ 7.) Ms. Allen handed in her resignation to Dr. Olsson on January 29,2007, effective February 
16,2007. Just two days after Ms. Allen handed in her resignation, Ms. Hatheway sent Dr. Olsson 
an email suggesting that she was interested in Ms. Allen's position. (Id.) 
k. When other Department members learned of Ms. Allen's resignation, there 
was an outpouring of support for her from the Department faculty members who were dismayed to 
learn that Ms. Allen had decided to resign. (R. Vol. I, p. 155, ~ 19.) After receiving such a 
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strong show of support from Dr. Olsson and other faculty members, Ms. Allen withdrew her 
resignation on February 4,2007, much to the delight of many Department members. CR. Vol. I, p. 
100, ~ 7; R. Vol. I, p. 156, ~ 20.) 
1. Ms. Hatheway was not pleased that Ms. Allen had withdrawn her 
resignation, and she made her displeasure known within the Department. On February 7, 2007, 
she went to the office of one of the senior faculty members in the Department, Douglas Adams, 
and complained about Ms. Allen and Dr. Olsson. CR. Vol. I, p. 156, ~ 21; R. Vol. I, p. 196.) 
2. Ms. Hatheway's 2006 Performance Evaluation and Professional 
Development Plan. 
m. After further consultation with HR, Dr. Olsson felt that it was imperative 
that Ms. Hatheway be given an honest, forwarding-looking and balanced appraisal of her conduct 
in her 2006 Performance Evaluation, coupled with a Performance Development Plan ("PDP"), 
which was geared toward helping Ms. Hatheway ensure success in her job. In preparing the 2006 
Performance Evaluation, Dr. Olsson gave Ms. Hatheway an overall rating of "Needs 
Improvement." He noted that Plaintiff needed to improve in some areas, including civility, 
communication and teamwork. The 2006 Performance Evaluation and PDP were hand delivered 
to Ms. Hatheway on March 6,2007, by Dr. Olsson. CR. Vol. I, pp. 156 157, ~~ 22 and 23; R. 
Vol. I, pp. 197 204.) 
n. On March 7, 2007, Dr. Olsson asked the Director of Administration and 
Fiscal Operations, Suzanne Aaron, to meet with Ms. Hatheway and himself to discuss Ms. 
Hatheway'S 2006 Performance Evaluation and PDP. Ms. Hatheway objected to having Ms. 
Aaron join their discussion, so Ms. Hatheway and Dr. Olsson met alone in his office. The 
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outcome of that meeting was completely unproductive, as any attempt to discuss the documents in 
a professional manner was thwarted by Ms. Hatheway's vehement and forceful refusal to accept 
any criticism concerning her job performance. In addition, Ms. Hatheway refused to sign either 
document. (R. Vol. I,p. 157, ~24.) 
o. During the March 7, 2007, meeting to discuss the PDP and Performance 
Evaluation, Ms. Hatheway brought up for the very first time any mention of retirement and/or what 
she perceived as alleged age discrimination. When Ms. Hatheway made the retirement/age 
discrimination remark, the comment was not related to anything else that had been under 
discussion - Ms. Hatheway just stated, "I'm thinking that this may have something to do with my 
age," and Dr. Olsson responded, "Absolutely not!" Ms. Hatheway asked that Dr. Olsson change 
the overall rating on her Performance Evaluation from "Needs Improvement" to "Outstanding" 
and, when he refused to do so, she stated she was done talking because they weren't even close to 
solving anything due to Dr. Olsson's refusal to change Ms. Hatheway's Performance Evaluation. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 157 - 158, ~ 25.) 
p. Age was not a factor in any of the evaluations Dr. Olsson prepared for Ms. 
Hatheway. In fact, Dr. Olsson and Ms. Hatheway are close in age. CR. Vol. I, p. 160, ~ 32.) 
q. Ms. Hatheway was concerned that the PDP was some kind of disciplinary 
action. However, it was explained to her by Ms. Preston from HR that "performance 
development plans are intended to be proactive and supportive documents for the employee. 
They are not disciplinary in any way" and that, "The use of a PDP illustrates a commitment on the 
part of the supervisor to help the employee be successful." CR. Vol. I, p. 158, ~ 27 and R. Vol. I, p. 
205.) 
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3. Attempts At Resolution. 
r. Dr. Olsson and Ms. Hatheway were scheduled to meet to discuss the PDP 
30 days after Dr. Olsson gave Ms. Hatheway the document. Three meetings were planned to 
occur on April 2, April 30, and May 28, 2007. However, in early April, Dr. Olsson was notified 
by U of I's Ombudsperson, Roxanne Schreiber, that he needed to attend a series of sessions to 
address Ms. Hatheway'S grievances. After the final meeting with the Ombudsperson and Ms. 
Hatheway that took place on April 25, 2007, Ms. Hatheway and Dr. Olsson left the session and 
rode the elevator back to their floor. They had a conversation agreeing that the meeting had been 
productive. Ms. Hatheway did say however, that they still had work to do, and Dr. Olsson agreed 
with her on that point. In that meeting, they discussed Dr. Olsson's work style, which is collegial, 
but task oriented and not chit-chatty. Dr. Olsson thought that Ms. Hatheway, in this conversation, 
began to recognize and appreciate the differences between his approach to work and hers, which 
were simply different styles. Dr. Olsson also thought they were on the road to improvement. CR. 
Vol. I, pp. 158 - 159, ~ 28.) 
s. On May 11,2007, Dr. Olsson learned from Academic Vice President Paul 
Michaud CA VP Michaud) that Ms. Hatheway had filed grievances against him concerning: 1) 
compensation, 2) communication, 3) confidentiality, 4) age discrimination, and 5) retaliation, and 
that he would be conducting a problem solving session. This session occurred on May 18, 2007, 
as planned. A VP Michaud explained that the last two issues in Ms. Hatheway'S grievance could 
not be appropriately discussed in that setting, but would have to be taken to U of I's Human Rights 
Office. They did discuss the other three issues. In the meeting, Ms. Hatheway stated that she 
thought that the salary offered to Ms. Allen was unfair. On June 1,2007, Dr. Olsson provided a 
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written response to Ms. Hatheway addressing her salary concerns and urging her to move forward 
with meeting the goals of the PDP, which he believed would help resolve the communication 
Issue. CR. Vol. I, p. 159, ~ 29.) 
t. On August 29, 2007, Ms. Hatheway filed a complaint with the Idaho 
Human Rights Commission (IHRC) claiming that Dr. Olsson gave Ms. Hatheway a poor 
performance evaluation because of her age, then harassed her and retaliated against her when she 
complained about discrimination. That investigation resulted in a finding of no probable cause by 
the IHRC, which issued its decision on July 25, 2008. Ms. Hatheway tendered her resignation 
from U ofI on August 28, 2008. CR. Vol. I, pp. 159 160, ~~ 30 and 31.) 
4. Facts Surrounding Ms. Hatheway's Age Discrimination Claims. 
u. Ms. Hatheway claims that her Performance Evaluation for 2006 was a 
result of discrimination. Instead, the evaluation was based on Ms. Hatheway's job performance 
for 2006. She did not mention discrimination until the meeting to discuss her written evaluation 
on March 7, 2007. Ms. Hatheway's age was never a factor in any of Dr. Olsson's evaluations or 
his employment relationship with Ms. Hatheway. In fact, they are close in age. The reasons for 
Ms. Hatheway's evaluation are stated in the Performance Evaluation itself. There are no other 
reasons. Dr. Olsson recognizes that Ms. Hatheway had good evaluations from 2002 to 2005. 
However, the Performance Evaluation in question was for her performance in 2006. CR. Vol. I, p. 
160, ~ 32 and R. Vol. I, pp. 197 201.) 
v. Dr. Olsson did not conduct Ms. Hatheway's annual evaluation for the year 
2007. Ms. Hatheway's IHRC complaint had been filed and was pending. Dr. Olsson did not 
- 12 
believe it would be fair, under those circumstances, to be the evaluator, as Ms. Hatheway had 
already made claims of discrimination against him. (R. Vol. I, p. 160, ~ 33.) 
w. Ms. Hatheway claims that Dr. Olsson did not communicate with her and left 
her "out of the loop." While his work style may be different from Ms. Hatheway's, he does not 
avoid exchanging pleasantries. In the course of the day, Dr. Olsson focused on his duties and 
often had work to do in his office. It is true that he did not linger and have conversations with Ms. 
Hatheway, or any other staff person, but that has less to do with Ms. Hatheway than with the 
demands of his job. (R. Vol. I, pp. 160 161, ~ 34.) 
x. As part of her claim of age discrimination, Ms. Hatheway has brought up a 
faculty meeting that took place on October 4, 2006, in which there was discussion about Professor 
Robert Wrigley (Prof. Wrigley) stepping down from the position of director of the Masters of Fine 
Arts (MFA) Program, and that a decision had been made to create a new coordinator position to 
take over Prof. Wrigley's prior administrative duties. It should be noted that Ms. Hatheway did 
not attend this meeting, nor was she qualified to fill the position, which required a teaching degree. 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 150 164; and R. Vol. I, p. 113, Depo of Lillian Hatheway, p. 86, II. 11-19.) A 
recent MFA graduate named Pamela Yenser (Ms. Yenser) attended this meeting. Ms. Yenser has 
testified that Dr. Olsson stated he was looking for someone "young" and "energetic" and that Ms. 
Yenser would not be qualified. Dr. Olsson denies making such a statement and he denies that any 
such qualifications or criteria were ever implied during that discussion. Dr. Olsson also denies 
making any similar age-based comment to Ms. Hatheway concerning the MFA Coordinator 
position. (R. Vol. I, pp. 160 - 161, ~ 35.) The minutes do not reflect that Dr. Olsson made such a 
statement. (R. Vol. I, p. 213 - 214.) Other faculty members who attended the October 4,2006, 
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faculty meeting do not recall such a statement being made. CR. Vol. I, p. 149, Depo of Mary Ann 
Judge, p. 32, 11. 8-12; R. Vol. I, p. 125, Depo of Gordon Thomas, p. 31,11. 5-23; R. Vol. I, p. 140, 
Depo of Ronald McFarland, p. 31, 11. 6-19; R. Vol. I, p. 122, Depo of Jeffrey Jones, p. 28,11. 3-24; 
R. Vol. I, p. 134, Depo of Steve Chandler, p. 33, 11. 21-25; and R. Vol. I, pp. 129 - 130, Depo of 
Gary Williams, p. 65, 1. 24 p. 67, 1. 4.) 
y. Ms. Hatheway claims that a statement made by former U of I President 
White establishes some environment of age discrimination. As Dr. Olsson testified in his 
deposition, he never attended any of President White's state of the university addresses, and has no 
recollection of their contents or discussing any of them with any other U of I employee. Dr. 
Olsson did see an exhibit in Ms. Hatheway's Human Rights Commission complaint consisting of a 
transcript of a speech of former President White. However, that is all he is aware of concerning 
that matter. CR. Vol. I, pp. 162 - 163, ~ 38.) 
z. Ms. Hatheway claims that Dr. Olsson took away duties and tasks from her 
and did not provide a reason for reassigning her duties. In fact, he never revised Ms. Hatheway's 
position description. Nor was Ms. Hatheway ever demoted. Occasionally, to accomplish their 
job as a department, they have to shift tasks to address what needs doing now and who is available 
to do it. Dr. Olsson sometimes performed clerical tasks. There were overlapping tasks between 
Ms. Hatheway's and Ms. Allen's positions. CR. Vol. I, p. 101, ~ 9.) Some of the duties related to 
alumni donations to the Department may have lessened over time for Ms. Hatheway, because that 
function began to be computerized by the central office. CR. Vol. I, p. 163, ~ 39.) 
aa. The behavior of Ms. Hatheway that led to Dr. Olsson's concerns and her 
resulting performance evaluation was not just witnessed by Dr. Olsson and Ms. Allen. For 
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example, Professor Robert Wrigley recalls two occasions in which Ms. Hatheway came to him, 
complaining that she felt as though she had not been treated fairly in the hiring process. He found 
the tone of Ms. Hatheway's complaints very disturbing. He found the behavior unprofessional 
because he was not in any position to do anything about it and he was not the appropriate person to 
complain to. The complaints did not seem legitimate to him. It was disturbing for him to hear, 
and he viewed it as a disturbing kind of behavior. He felt like he was somehow being involved in 
a kind of a conspiracy that didn't exist. CR. Vol. I, p. 117, Depo of Robert Wrigley, p. 26, 1. 6 - p. 
27, 1. 22.) Professor Wrigley believes that the communications he had with Ms. Hatheway 
negatively impacted the Department's ability to engage as a cohesive and supportive team. He 
described Ms. Hatheway's behavior as, "rage or dissatisfaction, making it uncomfortable to be in 
the office and to go down to the English office." CR. Vol. I, p. 118, !d., p. 54, ll. 2-25.) 
bb. There are a number of elderly members of the English Department. Many 
faculty members in this case testified that they had never witnessed any incident which they would 
consider as age discrimination during their terms of employment with U of 1. For example, 
Robert Wrigley, who's date of birth is , has never had a time or an occasion that 
he witnessed where he believes U of I or its agents or employees treated someone differently 
because of their age. (R. Vol. I, pp. 116 and 119, Depo of Robert Wrigley, p. 6, 11. 21-24 and p. 62, 
11. 4-10.) Professor Steve Chandler was born on . He has been at U ofl for over 30 
years. In his time at U of I, Professor Chandler has observed that age is not a factor in how older 
individuals are treated. They are treated as anybody else would be -- on their job performance. 
Professor Chandler has no reason to believe that Dr. Olsson discriminated against Ms. Hatheway 
based on her age. CR. Vol. I, pp. 133 and 135 - 136, Depo of Steve Chandler, p. 6, 11. 13-14; and R. 
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Vol. I, pp. 135 136, p. 45, 1. 20 - p. 50,1. 12.) Professor Ron McFarland was born on  
, and has been an English Professor at U of! for over 34 years. (R. Vol. I, p. 139, Depo of 
Ronald McFarland, p. 6, 1. 6 p. 8, 1. 21.) Professor McFarland has never observed any instance 
at U of I of what he believed to be age discrimination. He has not observed anyone over the age of 
40 being discriminated against in the English Department. (R. Vol. I, p. 141, Id., p. 46, 1. 12 - p. 
48, 1. 4.) Professor Mary Blew was born on . She was hired by U of! in 1994 
(age 55). When her deposition was taken on June 23, 2010, Professor Blew was over 70 years 
old. She has no recollection of any time where she thought or believed that any U of I employee 
was being treated differently because of age. (R. Vol. I, p. 144 - 146, Depo of Mary Blew, p. 6, 1. 
21 p. 9, 1. 13; and p. 29, 1. 21 - p. 30,1. 5.) Professor Gary Williams was born on . 
(R. Vol. I, p. 128, Depo of Gary Williams, p. 7,1. 5 I. 9.) He has never in his own experience 
witnessed or perceived anybody at U of! ever being treated differently because of their age. (Id., 
R. Vol. I, p. 130, !d., p. 68, 11. 16-20.) 
D. Standard of Review 
This Court's review of a district court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is the 
same as that required of the district court when ruling on the motion. Friel v. Boise City Housing 
Authority, 126 Idaho 484, 485, 887 P.2d 29,30 (1994). If the evidence reveals no disputed issues 
of material fact, what remains is a question of law over which this Court exercises free review. 
Id., citing Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 272, 869 P.2d 1365, 1367 
(1994). 
Summary judgment is proper if "the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and 
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that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P.56(c). The movant 
has the burden of showing that no genuine issues of material fact exist. Stoddart v. Pocatello Sch. 
Dist. No. 25, 149 Idaho 679, 683, 239 P.3d 784, 788 (2010). Disputed facts and reasonable 
inferences are construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Castorena v. Gen. Elec., 149 Idaho 
609,613,238 P.3d 209, 213 (2010). 
When a motion for summary judgment is "supported by a particularized affidavit, the 
opposing party may not rest upon bare allegations or denials in his pleadings," but must set forth 
"specific facts" showing a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 56(e); Verbillis v. Dependable Appliance Co., 
107 Idaho 335, 337, 689 P.2d 227, 229 (Ct. App. 1984). A "mere scintilla" of evidence or only a 
"slight doubt" as to the facts is insufficient to withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark 
Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986), citing Snake River Equip. Co. v. 
Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 691 P .2d 787 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Jenkins v. Boise Cascade 
Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 238, 108 P.3d 380,385 (2005). Finally, the initial burden of establishing 
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact is on the moving party, and once this burden is met, 
it is incumbent upon the non-moving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that element. 
Yoakum v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,923 P.2d 416 (1996). 
Additionally, in employment discrimination cases, the plaintiffs burden is not high at the 
summary judgment stage. Plaintiff "must only show that a rational trier of fact could, on all the 
evidence, find that [the defendant's] explanation was pretextual and that, therefore, its action was 
taken for impermissibly discriminatory reasons." Pottenger v. Potlatch Corp., 329 F.3d 740, 746 
(9th Cir. 2003). However, "when evidence to refute the defendant's legitimate explanation is 
totally lacking, summary judgment is appropriate even though plaintiff may have established a 
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minimal prima facie case based on a McDonnell Douglas type presumption." Wallis v. JR. 
Simplot Co., 26 F.3d 885, 890-891 (9th Cir. 1994). 
II. ISSUES ON APPEAL 
A. Did the district court err in granting summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's claims 
under the IHRA, including age discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation and 
constructive discharge? 
B. Did the district court err III granting summary judgment on Ms. Hatheway's 
emotional distress claim? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Ms. Hatheway's Age Discrimination and Constructive Discharge Claims Fail 
as a Matter of Law. 
The first section of the Idaho Human Rights Act (IHRA) declares that its purpose is to 
"provide for the execution within the state of the policies embodied in the federal Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, ... and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ... " (ADEA) Idaho Code § 
67 -5901. This Court has previously determined that the legislative intent reflected in Idaho Code 
§ 67-5901 allows Idaho's state courts to look to federal law for guidance in the interpretation ofthe 
state provisions. Ostrander v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Idaho , 123 Idaho 650, 653,851 P.2d 
946 (1993); O'Dell v. Basabe, 119 Idaho 796,811,810 P.2d 1082, 1097 (1991). Ms. Hatheway's 
age discrimination related claims under the Idaho Human Rights Act should, therefore, be 
considered in light of the ADEA and related case law. 
This Court addressed the elements for an ADEA claim in Waterman v. Nationwide Mut. 
Ins. Co., 146 Idaho 667, 201 P.3d 640 (2009). Just as in Waterman, to establish an age 
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discrimination claim for the purposes of this case, Ms. Hatheway must first demonstrate that she 
was a member of a protected class, which here is an employee at least 40 years of age. 29 U.S.C. 
§ 631(a); Wallis v. JR. Simp/at Co., 26 F.3d 885, 891 (9th Cir. 1994). See also Idaho Code § 
67-5909. Second, Ms. Hatheway must demonstrate that she was performing her job in a 
satisfactory manner. Peterson v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 358 F.3d 599, 603 (9th Cir. 2004); Wallis, 
26 F.3d at 891. Third, Ms. Hatheway must demonstrate that she was discharged or her employer 
took adverse employment action against her. Id. Fourth, Ms. Hatheway must demonstrate that 
her position was filled by a younger person of equal or lesser qualifications. Wallis, 26 F.3d at 
891. In Waterman, supra, the third element of his ADEA claim was dispositive, so the Court did 
not address elements one, two or four. 146 Idaho at 672. This element of Ms. Hatheway's claim 
is also dispositive. Ms. Hatheway was not discharged, nor did her employer take adverse 
employment action against her based upon her age. 
In Waterman, the Court set forth the standard for an age discrimination and constructive 
discharge claim, which also controls in this case: 
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To establish the third element of Appellant's ADEA claim, he must 
prove he was discharged or Respondent took adverse employment action 
against him. In this case, Appellant contends he was constructively 
discharged. "Under the constructive discharge doctrine, an employee's 
reasonable decision to resign because of unendurable working conditions is 
assimilated to a formal discharge for remedial purposes. The inquiry is 
objective: Did working conditions become so intolerable that a reasonable 
person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to resign?" 
Poland v. Chertoff, 494 F.3d 1174, 1184 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting Penn. 
State Police v. Suders, 542 U.S. 129, 141, 124 S.Ct. 2342, 2351 (2004)). 
Under the adverse employment action doctrine, the United States Supreme 
Court has stated, "A tangible employment action constitutes a significant 
change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, 
reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision 
causing a significant change in benefits." Burlington Industries, Inc. v. 
Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761, 118 S.Ct. 2257,2268 (1998) (comparing Crady 
v. Liberty Nat. Bank & Trust Co. of Ind., 993 F .2d 132, 136 (7th Cir. 1993) 
("A materially adverse change might be indicated by a termination of 
employment, a demotion evidenced by a decrease in wage or salary, a less 
distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished 
material responsibilities, or other indices that might be unique to a 
particular situation"), with Flaherty v. Gas Research Institute, 31 F.3d 451, 
456 (7th Cir. 1994) (a "bruised ego" is not enough), Kocsis v. Multi-Care 
Management, Inc., 97 F.3d 876, 887 (6th Cir. 1996) (demotion without 
change in pay, benefits, duties, or prestige insufficient), and Harlston v. 
McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379,382 (8th Cir. 1994) (reassignment 
to more inconvenient job insufficient)). 
146 Idaho at 672-673. 
The Waterman Court also addressed the existing standards for evaluating claims like Ms. 
Hatheway'S alleging disparate treatment based upon age: 
When a plaintiff alleges disparate treatment by an employer in an 
ADEA case, "liability depends on whether the protected trait (under the 
ADEA, age) actually motivated the employer's decision." Reeves v. 
Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 
2105 (2000) (quoting Hazen Paper Co. v. Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610, 113 
S.Ct. 1701, 1706 (1993)). Whatever the employer's decision making 
process, a disparate treatment claim cannot succeed unless the employee's 
protected trait actually played a role in that process and had a determinative 
influence on the outcome. Id. Stray remarks are insufficient to establish 
discrimination. Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(citing Merrick v. Farmer's Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434, 1438 (9th Cir. 
1990)). 
146 Idaho at 673. 
Several months after the Waterman decision, the United States Supreme Court provided 
additional guidance on a plaintiffs burden of proof in an ADEA claim in Gross v. FBL Financial 
Services, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 2343 (2009). According to Gross, plaintiffs pursuing claims of age 
discrimination under the ADEA must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that age was the 
"but-for" cause of the challenged adverse employment action. The burden of persuasion does 
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not shift to the employer to show that it would have taken the action regardless of age, even when 
a plaintiff has produced some evidence that age was one motivating factor in that decision. 129 
S.Ct. at 2345. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the proper interpretation of the 
ADEA is controlled by the standard established in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 
for cases under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 when an employee alleges that he 
suffered an adverse employment action because of both permissible and impermissible 
considerations i.e., a "mixed motives" case. !d. at 2346. Therefore, the burden of proof never 
shifts to the employer in an ADEA claim. As noted by the Supreme Court: 
The ADEA's text does not authorize an alleged mixed-motives age 
discrimination claim. The ordinary meaning of the ADEA's requirement 
that an employer took adverse action "because of' age is that age was the 
"reason" that the employer decided to act. See Hazen Paper Co. v. 
Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 610,113 S.Ct. 1701, 123 L.Ed.2d 338. To establish 
a disparate-treatment claim under this plain language, a plaintiff must prove 
that age was the "but-for" cause of the employer's adverse decision. See 
Bridge v. Phoenix Bond & Indemnity Co, 553 U.S. 639, ----, 128 S.Ct. 2131, 
170 L.Ed.2d 1012. It follows that under § 623(a)(1), the plaintiff retains 
the burden of persuasion to establish that "but-for" case. This Court has 
previously held this to be the burden's proper allocation in ADEA cases, 
see, e.g., Kentucky Retirement Systems v. EEOC, 554 U.S. 135, ---- - ----, 
---- - ----, 128 S.Ct. 2361,171 L.Ed.2d 322, and nothing in the statute's text 
indicates that Congress has carved out an exception for a subset of ADEA 
cases. Where a statute is *2346 "silent on the allocation of the burden of 
persuasion," "the ordinary default rule [is] that plaintiffs bear the risk of 
failing to prove their claims." Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49,56, 126 S.Ct. 
528, 163 L.Ed.2d 387. Hence, the burden of persuasion is the same in 
alleged mixed-motives cases as in any other ADEA disparate-treatment 
action. Pp. 2350 2351. 
129 S.Ct. at 2345 - 2346. 
The applicable statutory language of the Idaho Human Rights Act dictates the same result. 
According to Idaho Code § 67-5909, it is a prohibited act to discriminate against a person 
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"because of, or on the basis of, age ... " As provided in Waterman, supra, Ms. Hatheway bears 
the burden of proving that her age actually played a role in U of I's decision-making process and 
had a determinative influence on the outcome. 146 Idaho at 673. Moreover, as shown by the 
holding of Gross, and the plain language of Idaho Code § 67-5909, Ms. Hatheway must show that 
U of I discriminated against her "because of, or on the basis of," her age. The burden of 
persuasion does not shift to U of I to prove otherwise. 
1. The Salary Differences Between Ms. Hatheway and Ms. Allen Do Not 
Support a Claim of Age Discrimination. 
Ms. Hatheway makes no claim of age discrimination toward her at U of I from 1999 to 
2005, the first six years of her employment. Ms. Hatheway was in her sixties during most of that 
time. With a date of birth of , Ms. Hatheway would have been hired at the 
approximate age of 57. 
It was only when Ms. Allen came to the English Department as a Financial Technician that 
problems arose and for which Ms. Hatheway now claims age discrimination. Ms. Hatheway 
admits that she was unhappy that Ms. Allen received a salary that was higher than posted in the job 
announcement. (R. Vol., I, pp. 111-112) She points to no internal rule or regulation of U of I 
that would have required Ms. Hatheway to receive the same salary. Ms. Hatheway'S and Ms. 
Allen's jobs were different and served different functions within the Department. Dr. Olsson 
included Ms. Hatheway in the search committee to fill this position and Ms. Hatheway supported 
the hiring of Ms. Allen. (R. Vol. I, p. 111) 
It was explained to Ms. Hatheway that Ms. Allen's salary was based upon her knowledge 
and experience, market forces and the Department's needs. Ms. Allen was performing a different 
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job than Ms. Hatheway. Ms. Allen was willing to take the position at a salary commensurate with 
what she had been making in her prior, non-supervisory position at U of I. (R. Vol. I, pp. 152 -
153, ~ 10; R. Vol. I, pp. 97 -102; R. Vol. I, pp. 217 - 218, ~~ 7-8.) 
For some reason, Ms. Hatheway believes that she, as an administrative assistant, should be 
able to dictate the salary of another U of I employee who has different job duties, different 
experience and different credentials. Ms. Hatheway argues that Ms. Allen's position was "in the 
same pay grade" and that Ms. Hatheway had more "Hay points" and a longer tenure with U of I. 
(See, R. Vol. I, p. 70.) Without submitting any admissible proof, Ms. Hatheway offers the 
opinion that somehow U of I was obligated to pay Ms. Hatheway at least as much or more than Ms. 
Allen. Ms. Hatheway is incorrect. As Dr. Olsson explained in his letter to Ms. Hatheway of 
June 1,2007, Ms. Allen came to the English Department at a lateral salary of$14.70 per hour 
what she was earning in Sponsored Programs before she became a supervisor: 
That she should have come to the Department at the salary rate she 
did was a function of her previous salary, market forces, and our 
needs; as I explained two weeks ago, we must always weigh those 
issues in making hires if we are to move forward as a Department. 
I should also note something I've recently learned, that Hay Points 
only allow the Institution to place a position in a given pay grade; 
they are not designed or intended to address equity issues within a 
grade. 
(R. Vol. I, pp. 206 - 207.) 
Not only is Ms. Hatheway incorrect in implying that U of! somehow had a duty to pay Ms. 
Allen less (or Ms. Hatheway more), she presents not one scintilla of evidence that the pay 
difference for these two positions was in any way based upon Ms. Hatheway's age. To conclude 
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otherwise would require a reasonable person to conclude that U of! decided to pay Ms. Allen more 
so that it could intentionally discriminate against Ms. Hatheway when Ms. Allen was hired. 
Nevertheless, this did not prevent Ms. Hatheway from expressing anger toward Dr. Olsson 
and developing a poor attitude with resentment and a willingness to make disparaging remarks to 
other employees. For example, Ms. Hatheway vented to Professor Robert Wrigley on at least two 
occasions, complaining about the hiring process. Professor Wrigley had a "great fondness" for 
Ms. Hatheway but found her comments as "highly unprofessional" and as far as he knew the 
situation was "without basis." He referred to it as a "conspiracy that didn't exist." He believes 
that the communications he had with Ms. Hatheway negatively impacted the Department's ability 
to engage as a cohesive and supportive team. (See, R. Vol. I, p. 79.) 
Ms. Hatheway claims that she asked the Dean, Ms. Katherine Aiken, whether the pay 
differential between her and Ms. Allen was "because of age?" She further claims that in response 
to that question, Dean Aiken got "very furious" with Ms. Hatheway, and that "Dr. Olsson and the 
University denied any age discrimination in Dr. Olsson's decision to offer and give Ms. Allen a 
higher rate of pay than Ms. Hatheway." (See, R. Vol. II, p. 248.) Assuming, without conceding 
that Dean Aiken got "very furious," evidently if someone vehemently denies something (such as 
age discrimination), Ms. Hatheway believes that it should be viewed as an admission. U of I asks 
this Court to reject such illogical reasoning. 
Moreover, Ms. Hatheway has failed to present any evidence that other U of I employees 
with her same Administrative Assistant II job title were treated more favorably than her in terms 
of compensation. Ms. Hatheway provides no statistical analysis, much less evidence of a 
statistical pattern that U of I's hiring decisions adversely affected older employees. See Rose v. 
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Wells Fargo, 902 F.2d 1417, 1423 (9th Cir. 1990) (statistics must show "stark pattern of 
discrimination unexplainable on grounds other than age"); see also Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 
F.2d 703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993). 
Finally, what is curious about this part of Ms. Hatheway's claim is that Ms. Allen herself 
was 47 years old at the time she was hired. If U of I had an impermissible policy of hiring 
younger workers, it certainly was not shown in the hiring of Ms. Allen as a Financial Technician 
in the English Department. Ms. Hatheway has no evidence that the salary decision for Ms. Allen 
had anything to do with Ms. Hatheway'S age. 
2. The Alleged "Ageist Comments" Cited by Ms. Hatheway Do Not 
Show That Ms. Hatheway Was Discriminated Against, Based Upon 
Her Age. 
As part of her evidence, Ms. Hatheway cites so-called "ageist" comments from two 
sources. First, Ms. Hatheway cites to a May 1,2006, "State of the University" address by former 
U of I President, Timothy P. White, the contents of which apparently included reference to the 
need of some of the staff at the schools to seriously consider retirement and to help U of I recruit 
young, entry level or mid-career persons. (R. Vol. I, p. 15, ~ 2.8.) But, as noted by Dr. Olsson 
in his deposition and his Affidavit, he never attended any of President White's State of the 
University addresses and he has no recollection of their contents or discussing any of them with 
any other U of I employee. Moreover, Ms. Hatheway was not the only employee at U of I within 
the English Department who was in her sixties. Dr. Olsson himself is of similar age and many 
other faculty members serving in the Department at the same time as Ms. Hatheway are what one 
could call elderly; including Professors Wrigley, Chandler, McFarland, Blew and Williams. 
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(See the deposition testimony excerpts of the faculty members set forth in the Statement of Facts, 
pp. 15-16, supra.) 
The other "ageist" comments cited by Ms. Hatheway allegedly took place at a faculty 
meeting in October, 2006, in which there was discussion about creating a new coordinator 
position for the Masters of Fine Arts program. Dr. Olsson is alleged to have stated that he was 
looking for someone "young" and "energetic" to fill the position, and he's alleged to have told 
Pamela Yenser, an older individual, that she would not be qualified for the position. Dr. Olsson 
denies having made these statements and the meeting minutes do not indicate that any such 
comments were made. Moreover, Ms. Hatheway fails to show how any such comments could 
logically relate to her position as an Administrative Assistant at all. Ms. Hatheway was not at the 
meeting and was not even qualified to apply for the position. Ms. Hatheway did not possess 
even the basic entry level qualifications for that position, which required an advanced degree in 
English or writing, and college teaching experience. (R. Vol. I, pp. 161 - 162, ~ 35.)2 
The alleged "ageist" comments do not support an inference of discrimination because, 
even if they were true (which U of I disputes), they were not related to Ms. Hatheway'S 
employment. There is no evidence that any such stray comments, susceptible to a variety of 
interpretations, are remotely related to Ms. Hatheway'S eventual departure from U of I. The law 
is clear that "stray" remarks are insufficient to establish discrimination. Waterman, supra, 146 
Idaho at 673. Merrick v. Farmers Ins. Group, 892 F.2d 1434,1438-1439 (9th Cir. 1990). 
2 In a puzzling development, Ms. Hatheway actually applied for the MFA Coordinator position. She had to have 
known that she did not meet the qualifications for the job. (Jd.) One can only wonder why Ms. Hatheway would 
apply for a position for which she was clearly unqualified, unless she was attempting to bolster her age discrimination 
claim. 
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In Merrick, the plaintiff sued his employer because the employer promoted a younger 
worker instead of him. The supervisor that promoted the younger worker commented that he 
chose him because he was "a bright, intelligent, knowledgeable young man." The plaintiff 
argued this comment was sufficient to raise a triable issue of fact. The court disagreed, finding 
that the supervisor's alleged comment was a "stray remark." Id. at 1439. See also Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104 L.Ed.2d 268 (1989); Gagne v. 
Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 881 F.2d 309, 314-16 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that a "single, isolated 
discriminatory comment" by plaintiffs immediate supervisor was insufficient to trigger a burden 
shift or to avoid summary judgment for defendant); Smith v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co., 875 
F.2d 1325, 1330 (7th Cir. 1989) (noting that stray "remarks, ... when unrelated to the decisional 
process, are insufficient to demonstrate that the employer relied on illegitimate criteria, even 
when such statements are made by the decisionmaker in issue"); Nesbit v. Pepsico, Inc., 994 F.2d 
703, 705 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding that employer's use of the phrase "[w]e don't necessarily like 
grey hair" did not support an inference of discriminatory motive, as the comment was uttered in 
an ambivalent manner and was not tied directly to plaintiffs termination). 
- 27 
B. Ms. Hatheway's Hostile Work Environment Claims Fail as a Matter of Law. 
[T]o establish a primafacie hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff 
must raise a triable issue of fact as to whether her "workplace [was] 
permeated with discriminatory intimidation ... that [was] sufficiently 
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and 
create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 
510 U.S. 17,21, 114 S.Ct. 367, 126 L.Ed.2d 295 (1993) (internal 
quotation marks and citations omitted); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 
229 F.2d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000). The working environment must 
both subjectively and objectively be perceived as abusive. Fuller v. 
city of Oakland, 47 F.3d 1522, 1527 (9th Cir. 1995). 
Unlike a Title VII claim that is based on discrete acts of discrimination, 
a hostile work environment claim is based upon the cumulative effect of 
individual acts that may not themselves be actionable. Nat'l R.R. 
Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 115-16, 122 S.Ct. 2061, 153 
L.Ed.2d 106 (2002). In determining whether a hostile work 
environment claim exists that is actionable, the court looks to all the 
circumstances, including: frequency of discriminatory conduct; its 
severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or merely 
an offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an 
employee's work performance. Id. 
Jamal v. Wilshire Management Leasing Corp., 320 F.Supp.2d 1060, 1081 (D.Or. 2004). 
Ms. Hatheway claims that Dr. Olsson's attitude became cold and negative, that he kept his 
office door shut, avoiding communication and failing to follow up on required meetings. She 
claims that her work space was changed without her knowledge. She also claims that she had 
several primary job duties and responsibilities taken away from her. (R. Vol. I, p. 16, ~ 2.9.) 
Ms. Hatheway makes these allegations to support her claim of a hostile work environment, 
retaliation, and ultimately, constructive discharge. 
U of I does not accept Ms. Hatheway's description of the workplace environment or 
claims of retaliation. Moreover, Ms. Hatheway fails to relate her discomfort to any age based 
discrimination or adverse employment action. See Flannery v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 160 
F.3d 425, 428 (8th Cir. 1998) (shunning is not an adverse employment action where the plaintiff 
did not show that the ostracism resulted in a reduced salary, benefits, seniority, or 
responsibilities); "While adverse employment actions extend beyond readily quantifiable losses, 
not everything that makes an employee unhappy is an actionable adverse action. Otherwise, 
minor and even trivial employment actions that an irritable, chip-on-the-shoulder employee did 
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not like would form the basis of a discrimination suit." Smart v. Ball State Univ., 89 F.3d 437, 
441 (7th Cir. 1996). 
Moreover, as shown by the Affidavits of Dr. Olsson and Deborah Allen, Ms. Hatheway's 
duties did at times overlap with Ms. Allen's. Her job description was never modified. She was 
not demoted. Some of Ms. Hatheway's duties related to alumni donations to the Department 
may have lessened over time for Ms. Hatheway, because that function began to be computerized 
by the central office. (R. Vol. I, p. 163, ~ 39.) 
As noted in the Statement of Facts herein, many of the Professors serving in the English 
Department at the same time as Ms. Hatheway are what could be described as elderly, including 
Dr. Olsson, and Professors Wrigley, Chandler, McFarland, Blew and Williams. Moreover, the 
Professors identified herein all testified at their depositions that they have not experienced or 
witnessed U of I treating someone differently because of their age. 
Ms. Hatheway claims that she was forced to resign due to the alleged age-based hostile 
work environment at U of 1.3 (R. Vol. I, pp. 24 25, ~~ 5.1-5.7.) As noted by the Idaho 
Supreme Court, the question that must be answered is: "Did working conditions become so 
intolerable that a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to 
resign?" 146 Idaho at 672. Ms. Hatheway's claims of constructive discharge fail for two 
important reasons. First, working conditions that she described were not so intolerable that a 
reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign. As in Waterman, Ms. 
3 Ms. Hatheway gave two weeks' notice of her resignation/retirement. As shown by the Supplemental Affidavit of 
Dr. Olsson, the Department was required to act quickly to find a replacement and worked through Dean Aiken and the 
Human Resources coordinator to fill the position. (R. Vol. I, pp. 218-219) Ms. Hatheway was 66 at the time. U of 
I did not engage in a cynical attempt to blunt Ms. Hatheway's baseless age discrimination claim by attempting to hire 
someone of Ms. Hatheway's age as her replacement. 
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Hatheway was an unhappy employee. As such, "not every unhappy employee has an actionable 
claim of constructive discharge." Bolden v. PRC, Inc., 43 F.3d 545, 552 (lOth Cir. 1994). 
Secondly, as in Waterman, Ms. Hatheway has failed to establish a nexus between the alleged 
adverse employment actions of which she complains and any evidence that age discrimination 
was a motivating factor. 146 Idaho at 673. 
C. Ms. Hatheway'S Claims of Unlawful Retaliation Fail as a Matter of Law. 
In order to establish a prima facie case of retaliation, Ms. Hatheway must show: (l) that 
she participated in a protected activity, (2) that she suffered an adverse employment action, and (3) 
that there was a causal connection between her engaging in the protected activity and the adverse 
employment action. Kessler v. Westchester County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 461 F.3d 199, 205-06 
(2d Cir. 2006). Ms. Hatheway contends the protected activity she engaged in was her filing of a 
problem solving request with U ofI, notifying U of I's human rights compliance officer regarding 
her perceived age discrimination, and her filing of an age discrimination claim with the Idaho 
Human Rights Commission. Ms. Hatheway then contends she suffered adverse employment 
actions when, as a result of her lawful activities, she was given two poor performance evaluations 
along with a performance development plan, suffered the loss of automatic wage increases due to 
the poor performance evaluations, had job duties taken away from her, and was subjected to 
silence and a hostile work environment. 
U of I agrees that Ms. Hatheway received laudatory performance evaluations in previous 
years. She earned them and deserved them. However, she also earned and deserved the 
performance evaluations she received in 2006 and 2007. Ms. Hatheway'S resentment over Ms. 
Allen's salary affected her attitude and behavior. Dr. Olsson indicated in the 2006 performance 
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evaluation in several places that Ms. Hatheway "needs improvement." Simply because an 
employee disagrees with an evaluation does not mean that he or she is being discriminated against 
based on age. The undisputed facts show that by January 2007, Ms. Allen had reached the point 
when she felt it best to resign. Her interactions with Ms. Hatheway had become very difficult to 
tolerate. (R. Vol. I, p. 1 00, ~ 7.) Fortunately, Ms. Allen withdrew her resignation, much to the 
delight of many department members and the displeasure of Ms. Hatheway. On February 7, 
2007, Ms. Hatheway again went out of her way to voice her displeasure to one ofthe senior faculty 
members in the department, Douglas Adams, and she complained about Ms. Allen and Dr. Olsson. 
(R. Vol. I, p. 156, ~ 21, R. Vol. I, p. 196.) 
In preparing the 2006 performance evaluation, Dr. Olsson first consulted with the Human 
Resources Department at U of I. In the evaluation, he noted Ms. Hatheway's need to improve in 
some areas, including civility, communication and teamwork. Based upon consultation with 
Human Resources, Dr. Olsson also decided to use a Performance Development Plan (PDP) to 
assist Ms. Hatheway in improving as an employee. CR. Vol. I, pp. 156 - 158, ~~ 22-27.) 
Ms. Hatheway continues to insist that these were somehow disciplinary measures. (See, 
Appellant's Brief, p. 46.) Yet, at the same time, she continues to ignore the communication that 
was provided to her by the Director of Human Resources, April Preston, on July 24,2007, advising 
her that "Performance Development Plans are intended to be pro-active and supportive documents 
for the employee. They are not disciplinary in any way." (R. Vol. I, p. 205.) "The use ofa PDP 
illustrates a commitment on the part of the supervisor to help the employee be successful." Id. 
In keeping with her negative attitude, Ms. Hatheway refused to sign either the employee 
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evaluation or PDP. Ignoring the evidence of her own behavior, Ms. Hatheway instead argues that 
her less than positive evaluation must be evidence of age discrimination. 
Dr. Olsson did not conduct Ms. Hatheway's annual evaluation for the year 2007. Ms. 
Hatheway's IHRC complaint had been filed and was pending. Dr. Olsson did not believe it would 
be fair, under those circumstances, to be the evaluator. The evaluation was conducted by 
Associate Dean of the College of Letters, Arts and Social Sciences, Ms. Debbie Storrs. (R. Vol. 
III, p. 674.) And, even though out of 13 evaluation criteria, she received ten "meets requirements" 
ratings, two "needs improvement" ratings and one "exceeds requirements," Ms. Hatheway 
complains that this evaluation is somehow also evidence of age discrimination. On one hand, Ms. 
Hatheway complains that this performance evaluation prevented her from receiving an automatic 
pay raise. On the other hand, she acknowledges that after making "another complaint," she 
received a letter notifying her that she was receiving a $.38 per hour pay raise. (R. Vol. III, pp. 
674-675.) Again, Ms. Hatheway fails to show that this evaluation was in any way related to her 
age. 
As noted by the district court, the chronology of Ms. Hatheway'S interaction with U of I 
concerning her complaints does not support her claim of retaliation: 
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Ms. Hatheway filed her Problem Solving Request Form with the 
University on April 30, 2007; she met with the University's human 
rights compliance officer on May 30, 2007, and she filed her complaint 
with the Idaho Human Rights Commission on August 29,2007. After 
Ms. Hatheway had engaged in the listed activities, she received a 
performance evaluation that included only two "needs improvement" 
ratings, a significant decrease from the thirteen "needs improvement" 
ratings she received prior to her engaging in the listed activities. In 
addition, in 2008 Ms. Hatheway received a 3% wage increase. The 
evidence simply does not support Ms. Hatheway's claim of retaliation. 
While her perception that Dr. Olsson avoided communicating with her 
and that her job responsibilities had changed to some degree may be 
accurate, there is no evidence that the University retaliated against her 
because she engaged in protected activities. 
(R. Vol. III, p. 685.) 
D. Ms. Hatheway's Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress Claim Fails as a 
Matter of Law. 
As in any other negligence claim, a plaintiff seeking to prove a claim for negligent 
infliction of emotional distress must prove: (l) duty; (2) breach; (3) causation; and (4) damages. 
Johnson v. McPhee, 147 Idaho 455, 466,210 P.3d 563 (2009). Negligent infliction of emotional 
distress is simply a category of the tort of negligence, requiring the elements of a common law 
negligence action. Id. 
Here, the duty Ms. Hatheway would impose upon U of I relates to the age discrimination 
prohibition of the IHRA. As noted above, Ms. Hatheway's age discrimination claims fail as a 
matter of law. Therefore, U of I breached no duty to Ms. Hatheway upon which a negligence 
claim could be based. Because Ms. Hatheway has failed to show a material issue of fact on her 
age discrimination, hostile work environment, retaliation and constructive discharge claims, any 
emotional distress claim must also fail. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, U ofI respectfully requests this Court to affirm the Decision and 
Judgment of the district court. 
/ / 
/ / 
/ / 
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